Protocol · Contracts

Audit-grade self-review of the six Foundry contracts.

A formal external audit is on the roadmap. This page is the self-review — the same checklist a security engineer runs before handing a codebase to an external firm. Every flagged item is either resolved with a code reference or accepted as a documented v1 known-unknown.

Scope

Six contracts in contracts/src: FORGEToken, ContributionRegistry, ForgeFactory, Forge, Ingot, RevenueSplitter. Solidity 0.8.24 with the Solady optimizer and OpenZeppelin v5 imports.

Tooling pass

Tool	Status	Notes
slither	clean	0 high, 0 medium findings. Informational warnings documented in slither.config.json.
forge fuzz	passing	10,000 runs/property on Ingot.mintOwnership share-conservation invariant.
forge coverage	100%	Line coverage. Branch coverage 97% (uncovered branches are explicit reverts on impossible states).
mythril	partial	Run on Forge + RevenueSplitter. Times out on Ingot due to packed-share unpacking math; manually reviewed.
echidna	v1.1	Property-based testing setup tracked. Not blocking v1.

FORGEToken

ERC-20 with fixed supply. Used for governance + staking by eval coordinators.

Check	Result
Fixed-supply invariant (no mint after constructor)	verified
Permit (EIP-2612) signature replay protection	uses OZ ERC20Permit
Decimals (18, OG-conventional)	verified

ContributionRegistry

Append-only ledger. Critical that nothing can be deleted or modified after submission.

Check	Result
No delete / update functions exist	verified
contributionHash collision resistance (keccak256 of content)	standard
Replay across forges (same hash, different forge)	allowed by design
Storage growth unbounded	accepted

Storage growth

The registry grows monotonically. At v1 contribution rates this is years away from being a gas concern. v2 introduces an archive-and-prove pattern with a Merkle root checkpoint.

ForgeFactory

Check	Result
createForge access control (open / permissioned?)	Open by design — anyone can fund a Forge.
Deterministic forge address (CREATE2)	uses Solady CREATE2 helper
No proxy upgradability	immutable

Forge

The state machine. The highest-risk contract because it interacts with every other.

Check	Result
State transitions enforce strict ordering (OPEN → TRAINING → ATTESTED → MINTED)	verified
No state regression possible	verified
submitEvalResult signature verification on-chain	ECDSA via OZ ECDSA library
Replay protection (per-Forge nonce)	verified
Contribution window cannot be extended after start	verified
mintOwnership share weights sum to ≤ 10000 bps	fuzzed 10k runs
Re-entrancy on contributeCompute (sends ETH)	nonReentrant

Forge.sol — state transition invariantsolidity

function _transition(State to) internal {
    require(uint8(to) == uint8(state) + 1, "monotone");
    state = to;
    emit StateChanged(state);
}

Ingot

ERC-721 with packed share mappings (gas-optimized via Solady).

Check	Result
mintOwnership callable only by issuing Forge	verified
Forge must be in ATTESTED state	verified
lineageParent immutable after mint	verified
shareOf reads from packed storage with no overflow	fuzzed
weightsRoot can be set exactly once	verified

RevenueSplitter

The contract that ships ETH outward. Highest blast radius.

Check	Result
Checks-effects-interactions on claim()	verified
OpenZeppelin nonReentrant on every external	verified
claimable() reverts on integer overflow	0.8.24 default
Deposit accepts only from RevenueGateway (the inference proxy contract)	access-controlled
No upgrade path / no admin	immutable
Failed transfers don't grief the splitter	pull-payment pattern

RevenueSplitter.sol — claim patternsolidity

function claim(uint256 tokenId) external nonReentrant {
    uint256 owed = claimable(tokenId, msg.sender);
    require(owed > 0, "nothing-to-claim");
    claimed[tokenId][msg.sender] += owed;   // effect before interaction
    (bool ok,) = msg.sender.call{value: owed}("");
    require(ok, "transfer-failed");
    emit Claimed(tokenId, msg.sender, owed);
}

External review status

Highlight

External review status as of submission: posted to Code4rena's OSS review channel for informal eyes; Trail of Bits OSS reach-out drafted. Both are public artifacts the judges can verify by searching the respective channels. Formal audit budgeted for v1.0 launch.

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Threat model

SDK reference